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Increased awareness and heightened concern about the danger of oper-
ating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol have thrust the
drunk driving menace to the forefront of America's social consciousness.,
As a result of the increased awareness of traffic fatalities attributable to
alcohol consumption, some states have employed roadblocks as devices to
detect and to deter drunk driving.' Sobriety checkpoints generally entail the
slowing and eventual stopping of traffic to check for valid driver's licenses,
proper vehicle registration forms, and outward signs of intoxication of the
drivers.' Stopping an automobile and detaining the occupants at a roadblock
constitutes a seizure under the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution.' Under the fourth amendment, a search and seizure is pre-
1. See How Safe?, Newsweek, June 2, 1986, at 7 (43,500 people died in automobile
accidents in 1985); A Sober Look at a Drunken Driving Cure-All, Wall Street J., Dec. 31, 1985,
at 8, col. 3 (approximately 25,000 people die each year in alcohol-related traffic accidents);
Drunk Drivers' Deaths Fall 24%, Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1985, at A17, col. 1 (43% of fatal
traffic accidents involved drunk drivers in 1984, whereas 50% of traffic fatalities involved drunk
drivers in 1980); One Less for the Road?, Time, May 20, 1985, at 76 (30-50% of traffic fatalities
involve drunk drivers); Drunken Driving Toll Is Down, But Fears Remain, N.Y. Times, Feb.
6, 1984, at A17, col. I (death toll resulting from drunk driving was approximately 21,500 in
1983); Lauter, The Drunk Driving Blitz, Nat'l L.J., March 22, 1982, at 1, col. 2 (alcohol-
related traffic accidents result in estimated 25,000 deaths each year). In addition to fatalities,
drunk drivers cause approximately one million injuries and $5 billion in property damage yearly.
Lauter, supra, at 1; see Alcohol Traffic Safety-Nat'l Driving Register Act of 1982, 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3367, 3368 (half of traffic fatalities are result of drunk driving). In
1982, Congress enacted legislation to give pecuniary incentives to states to aggressively combat
drunk driving. 1982 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. Naws at 3368-69 (encouraging states to heighten
public's perception of increased enforcement of tougher drunk driving laws). Heightened concern
about drunk driving has spawned various citizen groups whose primary purpose is combatting
drunk driving. Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitu-
tionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. L.J. 1457, 1457 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Roadblock
Seizures]; Note, The Constitutionality of Roadblocks Conducted to Detect Drunk Drivers in
Indiana, 17 IND. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Drunk Drivers in Indiana].
The citizen groups include Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Students Against Drunk
Driving (SADD), Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), Citizens of Safe Driving (CSD), and
Report Every Drunk Driver Immediately (REDDI). Roadblock Seizures, supra, at 1457; Drunk
Drivers in Indiana, supra, at 1065.
2. See Kamen, Court Lets Stand Virginia's Use of Sobriety Roadblock, Wash. Post,
March 25, 1986, at 4, col. 5 (thirty states and the District of Columbia have used drunk driving
roadblocks).
3. Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protections, 12
Am. J. CRIM. L. 123, 123 (1984); Jacobs & Strossen, Mass Investigation Without Individualized
Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C.D. L.
REv. 595, 597 (1985).
4. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 556 (1976); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (fourth amendment protects
against unreasonable search and seizures). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that a seizure involves the police restraining the liberty of a citizen. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. For
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sumptively unreasonable,- and the government has the burden of proving the
legitimacy of the seizure. 6 To determine the reasonableness of a seizure
under the fourth amendment, the United States Supreme Court has estab-
lished a three-pronged test. First, the reasonableness of a seizure depends on
a favorable balance between the public's interest in the seizure and the
individual's right against arbitrary police harassment.7 Second, reasonable-
ness is contingent upon the existence of legitimate means to implement the
compelling state interest.' Third, the state must effect the implementation of
the compelling societal interest with minimal intrusion on the individual's
example, when police restrict a person's freedom to walk away, a seizure has occurred. Id. at
16; see infra note 6 and accompanying text (fourth amendment imposes standard of reasona-
bleness on seizures).
5. State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 55, 493 A.2d 1271, 1286 (1985) (courts presume
warrantless searches and seizures unreasonable); Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 627 (fourth
amendment presumes search and seizures are unreasonable).
6. See Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 627. The fourth amendment requires that
seizures meet a standard of reasonableness. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (stating
that fourth amendment requires that seizures be reasonable); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653-54 (1979) (fourth amendment imposes standard of reasonableness upon seizures); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (fourth amendment requires seizures to be
reasonable). The United States Supreme Court has not stated whether the government or the
individual has the burden of proof in a fourth amendment analysis concerning the reasonableness
of a search or seizure. Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 627. The Supreme Court in Delaware
v. Prouse, however, implied that the burden of proof rests on the government. Id. at 267 n.138;
see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (implying that state must supply empirical
data to demonstrate effectiveness of law enforcement technique). But see Prouse, 440 U.S. at
667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Court erroneously placed burden of proof on government to
show reasonableness of state interest). In assessing the reasonableness of sobriety checkpoints,
some state courts have placed the burden of proof on the government. See, e.g., State v. Jones,
482 So.2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1986) (state failed to prove drunk driving roadblock met fourth
amendment standards); State v. McLaughlin, -Ind. App.-, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1130,
1137-42 (1984) (state failed to meet burden of proving reasonableness of sobriety roadblock);
State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,-, 673 P.2d 1174, 1186 (1983) (Prager, J., dissenting)
(majority correctly placed burden of proving reasonableness of drunk driving roadblock on
state); Commonwealth v. Amaral, 398 Mass. 9 , 101, 495 N.E.2d 276, 279 (1986) (invalidating
sobriety checkpoint because state failed to demonstrate reasonableness of checkpoint); Com-
monwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81,-, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (1985) (state bears burden
of proving reasonableness of sobriety roadblock); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Minn.
App. 1985) (invalidating sobriety checkpoint because state failed to meet burden of proving
roadblock more effective and less intrusive than alternative methods); State v. Kirk, 202 N.J.
Super. 28, 55, 493 A.2d 1271, 1287 (1985) (state failed to demonstrate reasonableness of drunk
driving roadblock); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676, 681 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (burden on state
to prove validity of warrantless seizure).
7. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (constitutionality of seizure involves
weighing public interest against individual interests); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979) (fourth amendment measures reasonableness of police practice by balancing intrusion
upon individual rights against promotion of government interest); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (constitutionality of seizure depends on balance between public
interest and individual rights); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)
(reasonableness of police action under fourth amendment depends on balance between public
interest and individual's right to be free from arbitrary interference by police).
8. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
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constitutional rights by pursuing neutral, nondiscriminating, nonarbitrary
guidelines.9 If a court finds that a seizure violates the fourth amendment
after considering the three factors in the reasonableness test, the court will
suppress all evidence obtained from the unconstitutional seizure.' 0
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the con-
stitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint, the Supreme Court has examined the
validity of roadblocks under circumstances similar to those surrounding
sobriety checkpoints." For example, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
2
police had arrested the defendant at an immigration roadblock near the
Mexican border.'3 The defendants contested the constitutionality of the
roadblock and sought to suppress incriminating evidence that the police obtained
at the roadblock.' 4 Since the roadblock constituted a seizure, 5 the Supreme
Court in Martinez-Fuerte employed a balancing test to determine the consti-
tutionality of the roadblock, weighing the public interest against individual
interests.' 6 The Court concluded that the government's interest in apprehend-
ing illegal aliens outweighed the individual's right to freedom from govern-
ment interference.' 7 Furthermore, the Court stated that the means by which
the government implemented the compelling government interest was reason-
9. Id.
10. See infra note 14 and accompanying text (exclusionary rule is judicially created remedy
to suppress evidence obtained from unconstitutional searches and seizures).
11. See generally Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (finding stops for license checks
without reasonable suspicion by roving patrols unconstitutional, but suggesting that roadblocks
are viable alternative); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (roadblock designed
to interdict illegal alien traffic is constitutional).
12. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
13. Id. at 545.
14. See id. In addressing the issue of the suppression of evidence at trial, the United States
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio stated that the fourth amendment serves to deter unreasonable
police intrustions. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The fourth amendment does not proscribe direct-
ly police misconduct. Id. The suppression of evidence obtained through unreasonable intrusions
is a judicially created remedy to protect fourth amendment rights by deterring illegal police activity.
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961);
see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (fourth amendment gives no remedies to
individuals against police other than suppression of evidence at trial). In Weeks v. United States,
the Supreme Court explained that the adoption of the fourth amendment was a historical reac-
tion to prevent governmental intrusions into the lives of private citizens. Weeks, 232 U.S. at
390. More specifically, the founding fathers designed the fourth amendment to protect citizens
from the equivalent of the English writs of assistance, which allowed unwarranted invasions of
private homes in colonial America. Id.; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (all evidence
obtained in violation of constitution is inadmissible in federal and state courts). In Mapp v. Ohio,
the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment enforced the
fourth amendment against the states as well as the federal government. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
15. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussion
of reasonableness of seizure under fourth amendment).
16. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555; see supra text accompanying note 7 (roadblock
seizure is constitutional if public interest outweighs individual's interest).
17. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561-62.
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able and minimized the resulting intrusion upon the motorists. 8 In analyzing
the degree of intrusion upon the motorists, the Supreme Court in Martinez-
Fuerte noted that, ordinarily, a constitutional seizure requires some showing
of reasonable suspicion on the part of the police.' 9 To satisfy the fourth
amendment reasonableness standard, the police generally must possess prob-
able cause or individualized suspicion. 20 The Martinez-Fuerte Court, however,
noted that police may dispense with the requirement of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion if the police effect the seizure according to specific,
neutral guidelines that limit the exercise of arbitrary discretion by individual
officers. 21 In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court analyzed the roadblock seizure in
terms of objective and subjective intrusion. 22 The duration of the detention,
the nature of the questioning, and the visual inspection of the vehicle
18. Id. at 562; see id. at 557-58 (seizure infringed upon individual's right to travel without
interference).
19. Id. at 560.
20. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (requiring that seizures be based on specific, objective
facts justifying intrusion on individual rights); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)
(police must base seizure on objective standard such as probable cause); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (requiring at least showing of individualized suspicion
for constitutional seizure); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (validating
seizure based on grounds less than probable cause because of strength of government interest,
minimal intrusion, and absence of viable alternate police methods); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1967) (probable cause not needed to stop and search, but officer must show
"specific and articulable facts" that justify seizure). In Terry v. Ohio, a police officer seized
and frisked the defendant without a warrant and without probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-
7. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the policeman's actions were constitutional
because the spontaneity of the encounter thrust the situation outside the purview of the warrant
requirement. Id. at 20. The Terry Court explained that when an officer has reasonable suspicion
that a suspect is armed and presents a threat to the officer and bystanders, the fourth amendment
justifies the seizure without probable cause. Id. at 24, 29, 30. The Court declared that the test
for a seizure based on a lesser standard was whether the circumstances would warrant a
"reasonably prudent man" to believe that the suspect presented a danger to the officer or to
others. Id. at 27.
While the Supreme Court in Terry originally designed the less stringent test of reasonable
suspicion as a measure primarily to protect police officers and innocent bystanders, the Court
now applies the individualized suspicion standard to any situation in which a police officer
suspects illegal activity. Id. at 29-30; see Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (requiring that police entertain
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before stopping suspect); Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at
881 (reasonable suspicion of illegal activity justifies brief detention of automobile and occu-
pants).
21. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (fourth amendment requires that police have probable
cause, reasonable suspicion, or some neutral, predetermined plan before seizing individual);
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655 (police may implement other standards to restrict discretion of field
officers when probable cause or reasonable suspicion inapplicable); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
at 561-62 (while reasonable suspicion usually is minimal requirement for constitutional seizure,
fourth amendment allows lesser standard when police follow reasonable procedures in conducting
roadblock seizures and government interest outweighs intrusion upon individual rights); see also
infra text accompanying notes 111-27 (implementation of objective criteria ensures constitution-
ality of sobriety checkpoint without probable cause or reasonable suspicion).
22. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
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constitute objective intrusion.13 The motorist's perception of fear or threat
from unwarranted police harassment constitutes subjective intrusion.2 4 The
Supreme Court concluded that both the objective and subjective intrusions
of the roadblock at issue in Martinez-Fuerte were minimal because police
conducted the roadblock in a systematic, routine manner.2 1 Since the police
employed legitimate means to implement a compelling government interest
and the resulting intrusion upon the individual motorists was minimal, the
Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte held that the initial roadblock seizures
required no showing of "individualized suspicion. '26 Furthermore, the Court
dismissed the need for a judicial warrant authorizing the roadblock seizures,
finding that the visible signs of legitimate police authority provided the same
protections that a warrant would have provided.2 The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed, however, the requirement of consent or probable cause for searches
conducted after the initial detention at the roadblock.
2 8
The Supreme Court asserted the converse of the Martinez-Fuerte decision
in Delaware v. Prouse, by requiring that police have at least reasonble suspi-
cion of illegal activity before stopping an automobile in the absence of neutral,
predetermined procedures. "9 In Prouse, the police stopped the defendant's car
without reasonable suspicion of any illegal activity and without adhering to
neutral guidelines."0 The police saw marijuana in plain view in the defendant's
car and arrested the defendant for possesison of marijuana.' The defendant
filed a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence at trial, claiming that
the police violated the fourth amendment by stopping him.3 2 The Court
stated that whether an intrusion upon an individual's fourth amendment
rights is constitutional depends on the application by police of an objective
standard such as probable cause or individualized suspicion.3 3 When police
do not stop an individual on the basis of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, the Court stated that the government must provide other assur-
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 560. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
deemed the roadblock to be minimally intrusive because interference with traffic flow was
negligible, police did not surprise motorists with the stop, the roadblock involved minimal
discretion on the part of police officers, the systematic nature of the stops reassured drivers
that police officials authorized the stops, and administrative officials chose the location of the
roadblock. Id. at 559; see infra text accompanying notes 111-27 (discussion of criteria that
courts have required for valid sobriety checkpoints).
26. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562; see id. at 557 (requiring police to have reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity before stopping traffic at roadblocks set up to detect illegal alien
traffic is impractical owing to heavy flow of vehicular traffic).
27. Id. at 565.
28. Id. at 567.
29. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
30. Id. at 650.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 650-51.
33. Id. at 654; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1967) (courts must judge reasonableness
of seizure against objective standard).
1986] 1473
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ances that individual rights are not subject to the arbitrary discretion of the
police.34 Since the detention of the automobile in Prouse constituted a seizure
under the fourth amendment, 5 the Supreme Court employed a three-part
test to assess the reasonableness of the seizure, juxtaposing the interference
on the individual's constitutional rights against the assertion of a legitimate
government interest. 36 While the Court conceded the existence of a compelling
state interest in detaining automobiles for license checks, the Court in Prouse
noted the ineffectiveness of the means that the police adopted to implement
the government interest. 37 The Court did not use the terms objective and
subjective intrusion, 38 but discussed the concepts that the terms represent.
39
The Court stated that automobile stops are inconvenient and annoying, and
that the detentions generate "substantial anxiety" on the part of the motor-
ists.40 Given the nature of the intrusion resulting from the random detention
and the relative inefficiency of such detention, the Court refused to validate
the seizure in Prouse unless the police demonstrated that they had reasonable
suspicion to stop the defendant. 4' Since the police detained the defendant
without possessing reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal activity, the
Court concluded that the detention was unreasonable. 42 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court in Prouse stated that its decision did not preclude the use of
less intrusive means to effect the state interest in checking licenses, such as
stopping all traffic at a roadblock. 43 In sum, the Supreme Court opinions in
Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse indicate that police need not base a roadblock
seizure on reasonable suspicion or probable cause, but must operate the
roadblock pursuant to nonarbitrary, systematic procedures.
44
34. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55.
35. Id. at 653.
36. See id. at 653-54 (fourth amendment requires that police action satisfy standard of
reasonableness to protect individual constitutional rights).
37. See id. at 659 (Prouse Court apparently placed burden of proof on state to demonstrate
unavailability of less intrusive, more effective alternatives to government action). But see id. at
667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (burden of proof should be on defendant to prove unconstitu-
tionality of state action). In Delaware v. Prouse, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that absent some empirical basis showing effectiveness, the merits of the practice of randomly
stopping vehicles for license checks did not outweigh the resulting intrusion upon an individual's
right of freedom from police interference. Id. at 659. Furthermore, the Court in Prouse stated
that the deterrent effect of randomly stopping automobiles on license violations was negligible
and could not outweigh the intrusion upon one's constitutional rights. Id. at 660.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24 (defining objective and subjective intrusion).
39. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (random stops of automobiles generate anxiety in
motorists).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 661.
42. Id. at 663; see id. at 661 (principal factor from which fourth amendment protects
individuals is "standardless and unconstrained discretion" of field officers); see also United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (fourth amendment protects individuals
from evil of unbridled discretion of field officers).
43. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (emphasizing that roadblock must prevent "unconstrained
exercise of discretion"); see also id. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (suggesting that stopping
every tenth car at roadblock instead of all vehicles would pass constitutional muster).
44. See id. at 663-64 (suggesting that roadblock stopping vehicles in systematic fashion is
[Vol. 43:14691474
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When addressing the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints, several
state courts have employed an analysis similar to the analysis that the United
States Supreme Court used in Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse.4 5 The Virginia
constitutionally valid); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562-64 (validating roadblock operated
according to reasonable guidelines); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562,-, 492 A.2d 442, 446
(1985) (judicial warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion not needed to stop motorist
at checkpoint; see also infra text accompanying notes 111-27 (state courts finding sobriety
checkpoints conducted pursuant to neutral predetermined guidelines constitutional).
45. See, e.g., Klein v. Ronstadt, 149 Ariz. 123, -, 716 P.2d 1060, 1061 (1986)
(upholding lower court's decision that found sobriety checkpoints constitutional); State v.
Superior Court for County of Pima, 143 Ariz. 1,_ , 691 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1984) (en banc)
(finding drunk driving roadblock constitutional under fourth amendment); Ingersoll v. Palmer,
175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, -, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 667 (1985) (sobriety checkpoint constitutionally
valid if operated according to neutral guidelines); State v. Stroman, No. IN 83-02-005T (Del.
Super. Ct. May 18, 1984) (available August 26, 1986, on LExis, States library, Omni file) (drunk
driving roadblocks employed by Delaware State Police constitutionally valid under fourth
amendment); State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 31, 318 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1984) (drunk driving
checkpoint valid under fourth amendment); People v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273,-., 486 N.E.2d
880, 889 (1985) (holding drunk driving roadblock constitutional under fourth amendment), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 1384 (1986); People v. Lindblade, 492 N.E.2d 1015, 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(approving roadblock conducted pursuant to guidelines established in Bartley); State v. Garcia,
- Ind. App. -, 481 N.E.2d 148, 153 (1985) (sobriety checkpoint valid under fourth amend-
ment); State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (sobriety checkpoint valid under
fourth amendment); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,_--, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983) (holding
drunk driving roadblock constitutional); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1983) (sobriety checkpoint valid under fourth amendment), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1105 (1984); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 504, 479 A.2d 903, 914 (1984) (holding drunk driving
roadblock constitutional under fourth amendment); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81,
- 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1108 (1985) (sobriety checkpoint valid under fourth amendment and
state constitution); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 584, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (1980)
(drunk driving roadblock is constitutional under fourth amendment and state constitution);
People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 529, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654, 473 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1984) (holding
drunk driving roadblock constitutional); State v. Alexander, 22 Ohio Misc.2d 34,-., 489
N.E.2d 1093, 1093 (1985) (sobriety checkpoint constitutional under fourth amendment); Lowe
v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 352, 337 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1985) (sobriety checkpoint consti-
tutionally valid), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986); see also State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433,
439 (Fla. 1986) (drunk driving roadblock would be constitutional if conducted pursuant to
neutral criteria); State v. Abelson, 485 So.2d 861, 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding
sobriety checkpoint conducted pursuant to guidelines established in Jones constitutionally valid);
State v. McLaughlin, - Ind. App. , 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1142 (1984) (stating that sobriety
checkpoint might be constitutional under fourth amendment if state could demonstrate effec-
tiveness of roadblock); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Minn. App. 1985) (sobriety
checkpoint violated fourth amendment but would have been constitutional if operated according
to predetermined procedures); State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, -, 383 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1986)
(per curiam) (invalidating sobriety checkpoint that police conducted pursuant to no predeter-
mined standards, but implying that roadblocks operated according to neutral guidelines would
be constitutional); State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super, 28, 43, 493 A.2d 1271, 1279 (1985) (drunk
driving roadblock is constitutional if properly conducted); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 565
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (sobriety checkpoints would be constitutional if conducted pursuant
to statutory authority); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 394 (S.D. 1976) (drunk driving
checkpoint valid if operated under aegis of judicial warrant); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676,
681-82 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding drunk driving roadblock unconstitutional because state
14751986]
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Supreme Court recently endorsed the use of sobriety checkpoints in Lowe v.
Commonwealth,46 holding that the effectiveness of the roadblocks in detect-
ing and deterring drunk driving outweighed the minimal intrusion upon
privacy rights.47 In Lowe, the police arrested the defendant for driving under
the influence of alcohol after stopping the defendant at a sobriety check-
point.4 8 When the police detained the defendant at the sobriety checkpoint,
the police detected an odor of alcohol and noticed that the defendant's eyes
were red.4 9 The police, therefore, directed the defendant to pull the car over
and park in an area adjacent to the roadblock. 0 After the defendant parked
his car, the police asked the defendant to exit his vehicle and to perform
field sobriety tests. 5' When the defendant failed the sobriety tests, the police
arrested the defendant and, after obtaining the defendant's consent, admin-
istered a breathalizer test in a police van at the scene.12 The breathalizer test
revealed a blood alcohol content of .17 percent. 53 The General District Court
of the City of Charlottesville convicted the defendant of driving under the
influence of alcohol.14 The defendant appealed the conviction to the Circuit
Court for the City of Charlottesville, filing a motion to suppress all evidence
obtained from the roadblock. 5  The defendant claimed that the roadblock
violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable seizures.5 6 The circuit
court affirmed the lower court's conviction, and the defendant appealed to
the Virginia Supreme Court.57 In analyzing the validity of the sobriety
failed to prove roadblock superior to other techniques); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562,-, 496
A.2d 442, 450-51 (1985) (sobriety checkpoints constitutionally valid if conducted pursuant to
predetermined criteria). But see State v. Koppel, -N.H.-, 499 A.2d 977, 982 (1985)
(drunk driving roadblock constitutionally invalid under state constitution); Nelson v. Lane
County, 79 Or. App. 753, 761, 720 P.2d 1291, 1297 (1986) (drunk driving roadblock violates
state constitution); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, -Pa. Super.-, 502 A.2d 221, 225-26
(1985) (sobriety checkpoints invalid under state constitution).
46. 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1464 (1986).
47. Id. at 277.
48. Id. at 274; see VA. CODE § 18.2-266 (supp. 1986) (unlawful to operate any motor
vehicle with blood alcohol content of .10% or more).




53. Id.; see VA. CODE § 18.2-269 (supp. 1986) (blood alcohol content of .10 or more
creates rebuttable presumption of intoxication). The Virginia General Assembly recently enacted
a stiffer drunk driving law. See Tough Drunk Driving Bill Passed, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1986,
at Al, col. 4. The law now automatically considers intoxicated a driver with a .10% blood
alcohol content. Id.
54. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 274; Brief for Appellee at 1, Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va.
346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985); Brief for Appellant at 1-2; Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346,
337 S.E.2d 273 (1985).
55. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 274; Brief for Appellee at 1, Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va.
346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985); Brief for Appellant at 2, Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346,
337 S.E.2d 273 (1985).




checkpoint, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that the Virginia Constitution
grants no protections beyond the protections that the fourth amendment to
the United States Constitution provides. 8 The Lowe court, therefore, ex-
amined the roadblock under the fourth amendment. 9 The court noted that
stopping a vehicle and detaining the occupants constitutes a seizure under
the fourth amendment 6' and, therefore, assessed the reasonableness of the
roadblock balancing the state's interest in conducting the roadblock against
the resulting intrusions on personal privacy.
6'
In examining the validity of the sobriety checkpoint in Lowe, the Virginia
Supreme Court noted that the police selected the location of the roadblock
after considering the location of previous drunk-driving arrests and alcohol-
related accidents.6 2 Police officers operating the checkpoint received extensive
training by experts on the proper procedure for conducting the roadblock. 63
Although the police did not disclose the specific location at which the police
would conduct the sobriety checkpoint, the police gave advance notice of
the roadblock,64 and a lighted sign alerted motorists of the purpose of the
roadblock.65 The roadblock area was well-lighted, and two marked police
cars with red lights flashing were present.66 The police stopped all vehicles
travelling in one lane unless traffic backed up, at which time the police
allowed vehicles to pass through the checkpoint until the traffic cleared. 67
The police exercised no discretion as to which vehicle to stop, and the
detentions lasted approximately thirty seconds. 68 Police discovered more
license violations and lower blood alcohol content levels that police normally
detected during routine patrols. 69
In applying the fourth amendment balancing text to the facts of Lowe,
the Virginia Supreme Court acknowledged the overwhelming state interest in
apprehending drunk drivers.7 0 The Lowe Court, then, addressed the degree
58. Id. at 275.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 275; see supra text accompanying note 4 (roadblock detention is seizure under
fourth amendment).
61. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277; seesupra text accompanying note 7 (balancing test determines
fourth amendment reasonableness).
62. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 276.
63. See id. In Lowe v. Commonwealth, a manual specifically outlined the procedure by which
the police conducted the drunk driving roadblock. Id. The manual included criteria for the
selection of a roadblock site, a provision requiring that a supervisory police official would
assign officers to operate the checkpoint, and provisions establishing the manner in which the







70. See id. at 276 n.2. The United States Supreme Court and several state courts have
recognized the seriousness of the drunk driving problem. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville,
459 U.S. 553, 558 (1982) (acknowledging serious drunk driving problem); State ex rel. Ekstrom
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to which the roadblock advanced the public interest7' and the nature of the
intrusion imposed upon individual rights. 72 In determining the effectiveness
of the drunk driving roadblock, the court placed more emphasis on the
checkpoint's deterrent effect than on its actual efficiency in detecting and
apprehending drunk drivers. 73 While the court cited no evidence showing the
number of motorists arrested for drunk driving or the number of vehicles
detained at the roadblock, the Lowe court asserted that the sobriety check-
point would give individuals an incentive not to drive while intoxicated when
the drivers were aware that police would stop vehicles at sobriety check-
points. 74 The court, therefore, concluded that the sobriety checkpoint effec-
v. Justice Court of State, 136 Ariz. 1,_, 663 P.2d 992, 999 (1983) (en banc) (Feldman, J.,
concurring) (urging majority to take judicial notice of danger of drunk driving); Ingersoll v.
Palmer, 176 Cal. App.3d 1028,-_, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 666 (1985) (recognizing significant
state interest in combatting drunk driving); State v. Stroman, No. IN 83-02-0055T (Del. Super.
Ct. May 18, 1984) (available August 26, 1986, on LExis, States library, Omni file) (state has
overwhelming interest in clearing drunk drivers from highways); State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433,
439 (Fla. 1986) (state has compelling interest in protecting public from drunk drivers); People
v. Conway, 135 Ill. App.3d 887,-., 482 N.E.2d 437, 440 (1985) (state interest in apprehending
drunk drivers is substantial); State v. Garcia, -Ind. App.-., 481 N.E.2d 148, 152 (1985)
(state has vital interest in promoting public safety by clearing roads of drunk drivers); State v.
McLaughlin, -Ind. App._ , 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1136 (1984) (taking judicial notice of fact
that drunk driving is among worst of current social problems); State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242,
243 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (state has substantial interest in controlling drunk driving); State v.
Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, -, 673 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1983) (drunk driving problem creates
overwhelming state interest in eradicating problem); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 504, 479 A.2d
903, 912 (1984) (state has compelling interest in combatting drunk driving); State v. Crom, 222
Neb. 273, -, 383 N.W.2d 461, 469 (1986) (per curiam) (Krivosha, C.J., concurring) (drunk
driving is serious threat to society); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 525, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649,
652, 473 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1984) (state has overwhelming interest in controlling drunk driving); State
v. Alexander, 22 Ohio Misc.2d 34,-, 489 N.W.2d 1093, 1097 (1985) (taking judicial notice
of severity of drunk driving problem); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562,-, 496 A.2d 442, 447
(1985) (taking judicial notice of drunk driving problem); 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 10.8,
204, 206 (supp. 1986) (strong public interest in eliminating drunk driving problem exists).
But see Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 597 (over-emphasized publicity concerning drunk
driving problem has created mystical, perceived threat that precludes careful consideration of
intrusiveness of sobriety checkpoints). One commentator laments that questioning the consti-
tutionality and effectiveness of drunk driving roadblocks is an unpopular argument since the
sentiment against drunk driving is the prevalent attitude in society. Id. at 599.
71. See Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 276 (applying three-pronged test that United States Supreme
Court established in Brown to determine constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint); see also supra
text accompanying notes 7-9 (discussing Supreme Court's balancing test).
72. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 276; see id. at 275 (individuals have rights against unwarranted
intrusions while operating motor vehicles). In Lowe, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy and a right against unreasonable government
intrusion while operating a vehicle. Id.
73. See id. at 277 (Lowe court stating that deterrent effect of sobriety checkpoint is
obvious).
74. Id.; see State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 136 Ariz. I,. , 663 P.2d
992, 1001 (1983) (en banc) (Feldman, J., concurring) (advance publicity amplifies deterrent
effect of sobriety checkpoint); Ingersol v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, -, 221 Cal. Rptr.
659, 669 (1985) (advance publicity increases deterrent effect of drunk driving roadblock); State
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tively implemented the strong state interest in eliminating drunk driving.
7
v. Stroman, No. IN 83-02-0055T (Del. Super. Ct. May 18, 1984) (available August 26, 1986,
on LExIs, States library, Omni file) (drunk driving roadblocks have substantial deterrent effect);
State v. McLaughlin, -_Ind. App.-, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1137-38 (1984) (sobriety roadblock
has deterrent effect if police give advance notice of roadblock, even if roadblock is not as
effective as ordinary methods of detecting drunk drivers); State v. Garcia, - Ind. App. -,
481 N.E.2d 148, 154 (1985) (sobriety roadblock deters people from driving drunk); Little v.
State, 300 Md. 485, 505-06, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (1984) (correlating decrease in alcohol-related
accidents with deterrent effect of drunk driving roadblock); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599,
604 (Minn. App. 1985) (requiring police to publicize drunk driving roadblock in advance);
People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 528-29, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653-54, 473 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1984)
(sobriety checkpoints have deterrent effect without substantial intrusion upon personal privacy
even though effectiveness of sobriety roadblock in reducing alcohol-related accidents is not
known); Roadblock Seizures, supra note 1, at 1472 (drunk driving roadblocks deter drunk
driving and are effective in apprehending drunk drivers).
75. See Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277; infra text accompanying note 105 (courts measure
effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints either by effectiveness in detecting and apprehending drunk
drivers or by effectiveness in deterring drivers from drinking and driving). States should be
more interested in deterring drunk driving than in apprehending motorists who actually drink
and drive. See State v. Superior Court for County of Pima, 143 Ariz. 45,-., 691 P.2d 1073,
1076 (1984) (en banc) (primary purpose of sobriety checkpoint is deterrence, not arrests);
Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, -, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 666 (1985) (common sense
suggests that courts should determine effectiveness of drunk driving roadblock according to
number of people deterred from drunk driving, not according to number of people arrested for
drunk driving); Comment, Sobriety Checkpoint Roadblocks: Constitutional in Light of Delaware
v. Prouse? 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 813, 833 (1984) (even if police make few arrests for drunk
driving as result of sobriety checkpoint, goal of roadblock is achieved if roadblock deters drunk
driving).
While the Virginia Supreme Court in Lowe offered no empirical demonstration of the
effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint in detecting drunk drivers, several state courts have
concluded that drunk driving roadblocks are an effective means to detect drunk drivers and
to reduce drunk driving. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court for County of Pima, 143 Ariz. 45, -,
691 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1984) (en banc) (crediting drunk driving roadblocks for decline in alcohol-
related accidents); State v. Stroman, No. IN 83-02-005ST (Del. Super. Ct. May 18, 1984)
(available August 26, 1986, on LExis, States library, Omni file) (sobriety checkpoints effectively
contribute to highway safety); People v. Conway, 135 Il1. App. 3d 887,-, 482 N.E.2d 437,
440 (1985) (drunk driving roadblocks are effective means to apprehend drunk drivers in light
of substantial state interest); State v. Garcia, -_Ind. App.-_, 481 N.E.2d 148, 152 (1985)
(sobriety checkpoint seizures are reasonable given significant number of deaths attributable to
drinking and driving); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 505, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (1984) (sobriety
checkpoint is moderately effective in detecting drunk drivers). But see State v. McLaughlin, -
Ind. App.-, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1137 (1984) (finding that state failed to prove that roadblock
is more effective in apprehending drunk drivers than less intrusive traditional means). The
Indiana Court of Appeals in McLaughlin, however, stated that evidence showing the effectiveness
of sobriety checkpoints would ensure the constitutionality of such roadblocks. Id. at 1142. No
such evidence existed before the McLaughlin court. Id.; see Conour, Roadblocks, 28 REs GESTAE
388, 389 (1985) (McLaughlin court implied that empirical proof of roadblock's effectiveness
over traditional means of apprehending drunk drivers would ensure constitutionality of road-
block); see also State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,-_, 677 P.2d 1174, 1188 (1983) (Prager, J.,
dissenting) (state presented no evidence proving sobriety checkpoint is more effective than
traditional method of observing erratic driving behavior); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 513, 479
A.2d 903, 920 (1984) (Davidson, J., dissenting) (no empirical evidence existed in record to
support effectiveness of drunk driving roadblock in detecting and deterring drunk drivers);
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After asserting the compelling state interest in eliminating drunk driving
and concluding that the roadblock presented an effective means to carry out
the state interest, the Virginia Supreme Court in Lowe addressed the issue
of the roadblock's intrusion upon individual constitutional rights.7 6 The court
did not analyze the roadblock seizure under the standard of individualized
suspicion," but rather ascertained whether the police operated the sobriety
checkpoint according to neutral, predetermined guidelines. 78 The Lowe court
found that the police adhered to neutral, objective criteria delineated in a
police manual outlining proper roadblock procedure. 79 Furthermore, since
the intrusion upon motorist's rights to unfettered passage was minimal, 80 the
Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (invalidating roadblock because state
failed to prove that sobriety checkpoints are superior to other less intrusive means of detecting
and deterring drunk drivers); Grossman, supra note 3, at 156-57 (data does not demonstrate
effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in detecting drunk drivers because police arrest less than
one percent of motorists stopped at drunk driving roadblocks for drunk driving); Jacobs &
Strossen, supra note 3, at 640 (statistics do not demonstrate effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints
in reducing drunk driving). One commentator has claimed that any number of factors could
have contributed to the decrease in alcohol-related accidents that many have attributed to
sobriety checkpoints. Grossman, supra note 4, at 163. Tougher drunk driving laws, decreased
vehicle use, and the increased public awareness of drunk driving resulting from the campaigns
of citizen groups may have caused the reduction in alcohol-related accidents. Id.
76. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 276-77.
77. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussion of reasonable, articulable
suspicion of illegal activity).
78. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 276. The Lowe court stated that since the police did not stop
the defendant after suspecting some illegal activity, the court would examine the detention to
determine if the police employed neutral criteria in operating the roadblock. Id.
The principal danger of the sobriety checkpoint is the exercise of unchecked police discretion
such as the random and arbitrary harassment of motorists on lightly travelled roads at night.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (fourth amendment principally shields individuals
from arbitrary government harassment); see also State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 55-56, 493
A.2d 1271, 1275 (1985) (police violated state constitution by exercising unbridled discretion at
drunk driving roadblock). In Kirk, two New Jersey state troopers conducted a sobriety
checkpoint on a lightly travelled, rural road based on no predetermined guidelines and according
to the trooper's subjective discretion. Id. at 1273. The Kirk court stated that although a drunk
driving roadblock conducted according to neutral criteria would be constitutional, the roadblock
in Kirk involved the exercise of unbridled discretion by the police. Id. at 1275, 1279. The court,
therefore, invalidated the roadblock at issue in Kirk. Id.; see State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice
Court of State, 136 Ariz. I,_, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983) (en banc) (invalidating drunk driving
roadblock set up at discretion of field officers and operated without specific guidelines); State
v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, -, 383 N.W.2d 461,463 (1986) (per curiam) (declaring unconstitu-
tional sobriety checkpoint conducted without adherence to predetermined, objective standards).
79. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277. In Lowe, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that the police
did not exercise the unbridled discretion that the United States Supreme Court condemned in
Delaware v. Prouse as violative of the fourth amendment. Id.; see Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663
(principal factor from which fourth amendment protects individuals is "standardless and
unconstrained discretion" of field officers).
80. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277. In analyzing the constitutionality of the roadblock in Lowe,
the Virginia Supreme Court did not use the terms objective and subjective intrusion that the
United States Supreme Court originated in Martinez-Fuerte. Id. at 277; see supra text accom-
panying notes 22-24 (definition of objective and subjective intrusion).
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court in Lowe determined that the sobriety checkpoint did not constitute an
"impermissible infringement" on the defendant's constitutional rights. 8'
In addressing the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint, the Virginia
Supreme Court in Lowe correctly applied the three-part test established by
the United States Supreme Court.82 The Lowe court correctly determined
that states have a substantial interest in eliminating drunk driving and the
death and destruction drunk drivers cause.8 The court, however, should
have analyzed more thoroughly the effectiveness of the roadblock in detecting
and apprehending drunk drivers.8 4 The Lowe court asserted the effectiveness
of the sobriety checkpoint but cited little supporting evidence. 8 In Delaware
v. Prouse, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a police practice of
randomly stopping motorists for routine license checks on the grounds that
the state failed to establish with empirical evidence that random stops were
more effective in detecting license violations than less intrusive alternate
means. 86 Opponents of the sobriety checkpoint, relying on Delaware v.
Prouse, claim that since police discover a significant number of drunk drivers
by observing erratic driving behavior, the use of the more intrusive, less
effective sobriety checkpoint is unconstitutional. 87 Courts, therefore, should
81. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9 (discussing three-part, fourth amendment test
that Supreme Court established to determine reasonableness of warrantless seizure).
83. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277; see supra note I and accompanying text (documentation of
seriousness of drunk driving problem). But see Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 635 (only
small percentage of drivers on road are drunk and smaller percentage of drunk drivers actually
are involved in traffic accidents). Some commentators claim that given the number of drivers
on the road and the great number of miles travelled in automobiles each year, the number of
deaths resulting from traffic accidents is insignificant. Id. at 636. The commentators claim
that only 2.9 deaths occur in every 100 million vehicle miles. Id. Furthermore, the ratio of
traffic fatalities to population, miles driven, and licensed drivers has not increased over the
past fifty years. Id.
84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (assessments of state courts on effectiveness
of sobriety checkpoint).
85. See supra text accompanying note 74 (Lowe court did not determine ratio between
drivers arrested and drivers stopped).
86. See supra notes 6 and 37 and accompanying text (Prouse seems to require some
demonstration that police practice effectively promotes government interest); see also Common-
wealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81,-, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1112-13 (1985) (Lynch, J., dissenting)
(courts should determine if roadblock is more effective than less intrusive means to detect drunk
drivers). In Trumble, the dissent claimed that not addressing the issue of effectiveness relieved
the state of its burden of proving the reasonableness of the sobriety checkpoint. Id. at 1113,
n.l; see also State v. McLaughlin, -Ind. App._., 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1133 (1984) (Prouse
requires some showing that law enforcement methods promote state interest to greater degree
than other means); Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 633 (Prouse stressed need to demonstrate
substantial effectiveness of police practice with empirical evidence).
87. See Grossman, supra note 3, at 159 (using roving patrols is more effective and less
intrusive method to detect drunk drivers than sobriety checkpoint); Jacobs & Strossen, supra
note 3, at 609 (1.92 million drunk driving arrests nationwide in 1983 demonstrates effectiveness
of traditional law enforcement techniques); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text
(Prouse requires some showing that challenged police practice is more effective and less intrusive
than existing methods).
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juxtapose the effectiveness of detecting drunk drivers at sobriety roadblocks
against the effectiveness of alternate means of apprehending drunk drivers
because the existence of more effective, less intrusive law enforcement tech-
niques might undermine the constitutional validity of the roadblocks under
Prouse.88 For example, in State v. Koppel,s9 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court claimed that a sobriety checkpoint was not an effective means of
detecting drunk driversY° The Koppel court conceded that roadblocks might
have a deterrent effect, but ruled that the public interest in detecting drunk
drivers did not outweigh the roadblock's intrusion upon personal privacy
because traditional methods for detecting and deterring drunk drivers were
more effective and less intrusive than drunk driving roadblocks.9' The New
88. See Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, -, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 666 (1985)
(ascertaining existence of equally effective but less intrusive alternatives is inherent in determining
to what degree sobriety checkpoint advances public interest); State v. Muzik,-379 N.W.2d 599,
603 (Minn. App. 1985) (when evaluating constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint, most state
courts require demonstration of checkpoint's effectiveness in advancing state's interest in
controlling drunk driving); Roadblock Seizures, supra note I, at 1472 (absence of empirical
support for effectiveness of drunk driving roadblock might preclude operation of roadblock).
89. - N.H.-, 499 A.2d 977 (1985).
90. See id. at 982. The New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Koppel noted that out
of 1680 vehicles stopped at the challenged roadblock, the police made only 18 arrests for drunk
driving. Id. at 979. The Koppel court concluded that the roadblock was ineffective because
police made 175 arrests for drunk driving using traditional patrol methods during the same
period period of time. Id.
91. Id. at 982-83. In Koppel, the police parked three or four marked police cars at a
roadblock with lights flashing. Id. Police stopped all vehicles unless traffic backed up. Id. at
979. Police placed no signs or warnings alerting drivers of the roadblock and gave no advance
publicity. Id. Field officers exercised no discretion, and the police conducted the roadblock
according to procedures set forth in a manual written by supervisory personnel. Id. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court evaluated the sobriety checkpoint on state constitutional grounds
because the court determined that the New Hampshire Constitution provided greater protections
than the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 978-80. The Koppel court
concluded that under the New Hampshire Constitution, the sobriety checkpoint was unconsti-
tutional because the state interest did not outweigh the roadblock's intrusion upon individual
privacy rights. Id. at 982. But see Opinion of the Justices, -N.H. - , 509 A.2d 744, 745
(1986) (evaluating proposed legislative bill concerning sobriety checkpoints). The New Hampshire
House of Representatives requested the New Hampshire Supreme Court to draft an advisory
opinion concerning the constitutionality of a resolution setting forth guidelines for the operation
of sobriety checkpoints. Opinion, 509 A.2d at 745. The House bill provided that police acquire
a judicial warrant authorizing the operation of a drunk driving roadblock. Id. In addition, the
magistrate or judge issuing the warrant would consider the degree of intrusiveness of the
roadblock, safety provisions, the relative effectiveness of the checkpoint and anticipated
deterrent effect, and the factors determining the selection of the location of the roadblock. Id.
The bill would require the issuing judge to find that the roadblock was an effective tool with
which to detect and to apprehend drunk drivers and that the public interest in conducting the
roadblock outweighed the intrusion upon individual rights. Id. The bill also mandated that
police issue an advance notice, publicizing the operation of the roadblock. Id. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the bill would not violate the New Hampshire




Hampshire Supreme Court, therefore, invalidated the sobriety checkpoint at
issue in Koppel on state constitutional grounds.
92
In examining the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in detecting and
apprehending drunk drivers as required in Prouse, courts should differentiate
between the government interest in operating a drunk driving roadblock and
in conducting a license checkpoint. In Prouse, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that states have a substantial interest in enforcing inspec-
tion, registration, and licensing requirements. 9 Nevertheless, the Court in-
validated the roadblock at issue in Prouse because the state failed to prove the
relative effectiveness of the roadblock in detecting license and registration
violations.94 The state interest in eliminating drunk driving, however, is more
compelling than the state interest in enforcing licensing laws because drunk
drivers inflict so much death and destruction on the highways. 9 Courts,
therefore, should not subject the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in
92. See Koppel, 499 A.2d at 980, 982 (New Hampshire Supreme Court decided Koppel
on state constitutional grounds even though court used Supreme Court's analysis in Prouse);
see also Commonwealth v. Tarbert, -Pa. Super.-, 502 A.2d 221, 222 (1985) (invalidating
sobriety checkpoint on state constitutional grounds). In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, the police
arrested the defendant at a drunk driving roadblock for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Tarbert, 502 A.2d at 222. The police stopped all vehicles at the checkpoint and asked drivers
to produce licenses and registration forms. Id. In addition, police made physical inspections of
the automobiles and observed drivers for outward signs of intoxication. Id. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Tarbert decided the case on state constitutional grounds. Id. The Tarbert
court stated that the Pennsylvania Constitution imposed a standard of reasonableness on the
exercise of discretion by government officials, and therefore, employed a balancing test, weighing
the intrusion upon individual rights against state interests to determine the reasonableness of
the sobriety checkpoint. Id. at 223-34. The court concluded that the state interest of providing
safe highways did not outweigh the roadblock's intrusion upon individual rights. Id. at 225.
Furthermore, the Tarbert court claimed that no amount of control on police activity justifies a
warrantless seizure without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Id. at 225-26; see Nelson v.
Lane County, 79 Or. App. 753, 761, 720 P.2d 1291, 1297 (1986) (invalidating sobriety checkpoint
under state constitution). In Nelson v. Lane County, the police stopped the plaintiff at a
sobriety checkpoint. Nelson, 720 P.2d at 1292. The plaintiff brought an action against the
county seeking damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 1292-93. The Court of
Appeals of Oregon in Nelson found that police failed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
roadblock in detecting and apprehending drunk drivers. Id. at 1298. The police conducted the
roadblock pursuant to predetermined criteria, but the Nelson court noted that guidelines designed
to limit the discretion of individual officers were not adequate safeguards against the intrusion
upon individual rights. Id. The court, therefore, held that the sobriety checkpoint at issue in
Nelson was unreasonable and invalid under the Oregon Constitution. Id. at 1297.
93. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658.
94. Id. at 659.
95. See People v. Conway, 135 II. App.3d 887,-., 482 N.E.2d 437, 440 (1985) (state
interest in apprehending drunk drivers is at least as compelling as state interest in enforcing
licensing and registration requirements); State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242, 243 (Iowa Ct. App.
1985) (state interest in combatting drunk driving is greater than state interest in enforcing
licensing requirements); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676, 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (Sparling,
J., dissenting) (state has greater interest in detecting drunk drivers than in enforcing licensing
laws because drunk driver is more dangerous than unlicensed driver); see also supra note I and
accompanying text (drunk driving poses lethal threat on highways).
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detecting drunk drivers to the same level of scrutiny as the Supreme Court
in Prouse applied to the effectiveness of a roadblock in detecting license and
registration violations. For example, in People v. Bartley,9 the Illinois
Supreme Court evaluated the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in detect-
ing drunk drivers. 97 The Bartley court employed the fourth amendment
reasonableness test to address the constitutionality of a drunk driving road-
block, balancing the public interest against the intrusion upon the flow of
trafic.98 The Bartley court found a compelling state intertest in reducing the
number of alcohol-related accidents and deterring drunk driving.9 Although
the Bartley court conceded that observing erractic driving behavior is more
effective in detecting drunk drivers than roadblocks, the court expressed the
need to use roadblocks as well as traditional means of apprehending drunk
drivers."00 The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that the danger of detecting
a drunk driver using traditional police practices after the driver already has
wrecked warranted the use of all legitimate means to combat drunk driving.'
Furthermore, the Bartley court stated that while the use of statistics in
analyzing the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints would be helpful, the
absence of empirical data supporting the effectiveness of the sobriety check-
points would not invalidate the roadblock in light of the seriousness of the
drunk driving problem. 0 2 Courts, therefore, should not invalidate a sobriety
checkpoint when the state fails to demonstrate empirically the roadblock's
effectiveness in detecting drunk drivers as long as the operation of the
roadblock is minimally intrusive upon the constitutional rights of individual
drivers., 03
96. 109 Ill.2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1384 (1986).
97. See id. at 886. In People v. Bartley, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a roadblock designed primarily to check drivers licenses. Id. at 882. Police
stopped all traffic at the roadblock. Id. The roadblock was well-lighted and augmented by the
flashing red lights of police cars. Id. As the police checked the defendant's license, the police
noticed that the defendant slurred his speech, fumbled his papers, and stumbled as he walked.
Id. at 883. Police also detected the odor of alcohol. Id. The defendant failed the field sobriety
tests, and the police arrested him. Id.
98. Id. at 885.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 886.
101. Id.; see State v. Stroman, No. IN 83-02-0055T (Del. Super. Ct. May 18, 1984)
(available August 26, 1986, on LExis, States library, Omni file) (severity of drunk driving
menace warrants use of all legitimate methods to combat problem, including sobriety check-
points); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81,-, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (1985) (stating
that traditional methods of detecting drunk driving have failed and upholding constitutionality
of sobriety checkpoint); State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, -, 383 N.W.2d 461, 472 (per curiam)
(Boslaugh, J., concurring) (grave and pervasive drunk driving threat justifies the use of sobriety
checkpoints).
102. See Bartley, 486 N.E.2d at 885-86. Although the Bartley court did not invalidate the
sobriety checkpoint, the court did encourage police in the future to keep records documenting
the operation of the sobriety checkpoint. Id. at 886; see Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App.3d 1028,
221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 666 (1985) (courts should allow police to use potentially effective methods
even if statistics presently do not establish effectiveness).
103. See supra text accompanying note 9 (government must effect compelling public interest
in minimally intrusive manner).
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Even if the state is unable to demonstrate with empirical evidence the
effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint in detecting and apprehending drunk
drivers, the state still can satisfy the second element of the reasonableness
balancing test by showing the effectiveness of the roadblock in deterring
individuals from drinking and driving.' °4 The effectiveness of a sobriety
checkpoint can be manifested in either the roadblock's ability to detect and
apprehend drunk drivers or in the roadblock's ability to deter drivers from
driving while under the influence of alcohol.'°5 While the Virginia Supreme
Court in Lowe failed to determine whether the sobriety checkpoint was
effective in detecting drunk drivers, the Lowe Court correctly assessed the
roadblock's effect in deterring drivers form driving under the influence of
alcohol.'06 Although no practical way to measure the deterrent effect attrib-
utable to a sobriety roadblock exists,'0 7 the court in Lowe reasonably
concluded that the awareness of the operation of a sobriety checkpoint would
deter individuals from driving while intoxicated for fear of being arrested. 0 8
104. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (sobriety checkpoint deters drunk driving);
see also supra text accompanying note 8 (government must prove existence of legitimate means
with which to effect compelling public interest to prove reasonableness of seizure).
105. See LAFAvE, supra note 70, at 208-09 (effectiveness of sobriety checkpoint is mani-
fested in eithei identification or deterrence of drunk drivers).
106. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (sobriety checkpoints deter drunk driving).
107. See Grossman, supra note 3, at 160 (deterrent effect of sobriety checkpoint cannot be
supported theoretically or empirically); Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 639 (deterrent value
of sobriety checkpoints is not measurable); Carrizosa, Critics, Supporters Debate Worth of
CHP Roadblocks, L.A. Daily J., December 27, 1984, at p. 1, col. 6 (no statistical data concerning
deterrent effect of drunk driving roadblocks exist). One commentator has argued that a driver's
being intoxicated would reduce any deterrent effect of sobriety checkpoints because a drunk
driver might disregard the possibility of detection and apprehension. Jacobs & Strossen, supra
note 3, at 639 n.197. The flaw in the argument asserted by Jacobs & Strossen is that the
deterrent effect may not have its impact at the time when the inebriate decides to drive, but at
the time before the driver becomes intoxicated. The motorist, therefore, can plan to moderate
his or her drinking or pre-arrange alternative transportation.
Another commentator has asserted that two-thirds of all drunk drivers are problem drinkers
and that problem drinkers cause most alcohol-related traffic accidents. Grossman, supra note
3, at 161. The commentator claimed that roadblocks have no deterrent effect on problem
drinkers and that the overall deterrent effect of sobriety checkpoints, therefore, is reduced. Id.
at 160.
108. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277; see Bartley, 486 N.E.2d at 886 (roadblocks have deterrent
effect if motorists are aware of roadblock). The Illinois Supreme Court in Bartley stated that
advance publicity of the operation of a roadblock enhances the deterrent effect of the roadblock.
Id. at 888. Furthermore, the Bartley court reasoned that a sobriety checkpoint may not deter
all drivers from drinking and driving, but would deter some. Id. at 886; see State v. Superior
Court for County of Pima, 143 Ariz. 45,-, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (1984) (en banc) (while
sobriety checkpoint is no more effective than roving patrol in detecting drunk drivers, roadblock
is more effective in deterring drunk driving); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App.3d 1028, ,
221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 666 (1985) (sobriety checkpoints have deterrent effect if well-publicized and
properly conducted); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 529, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654, 473 N.E.2d
1, 6 (1984) (reasonable to conclude that checkpoint has deterrent effect); State v. Martin, 145
Vt. 562,-, 496 A.2d 442, 447 (1985) (sobriety checkpoint has deterrent effect on drinking
and driving); see also Carrizosa, supra note 107, at p. 1, col. 6 (deterrent effect extremely
important since most courts examine deterrence in addressing constitutionality of sobriety
checkpoint).
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Even though the Virginia Supreme Court in Lowe failed to evaluate thor-
oughly the effectiveness of the roadblock in arresting drunk drivers, the
Lowe court, nevertheless, correctly upheld the constitutionality of the road-
block on the grounds that the roadblock constituted an effective means to
deter drunk driving.'
°9
The Virginia Supreme Court in Lowe also correctly concluded that the
sobriety checkpoint constituted a minimal intrusion on the personal privacy
of the motorist, thus satisfying the third element of the fourth amendment
balancing text."" To minimize the intrusion upon individual rights of motor-
ists at sobriety checkpoints, the fourth amendment requires that police
officers not exercise unrestrained discretion."' Police minimize objective
intrusion by detaining motorists at sobriety checkpoints only for a minute
or less and by restricting the scope of questioning." 2 The Virginia Supreme
Court, unfortunately, gave little indication of how the police minimized the
objective intrusion upon the motorists detained at the sobriety checkpoint in
Lowe." 3 In Bartley, however, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the
objective intrusion of the drunk driving roadblock was minimal since the
detention ordinarily lasted for fifteen to twenty seconds, and the police did not
109. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (roadblock's primary objective is to deter
drunk driving).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81 (Virginia Supreme Court in Lowe determined
that sobriety checkpoint is not "impermissible infringement" on constitutional rights); see also
supra text accompanying note 9 (state must conduct sobriety checkpoint with minimal intrusion
upon individual rights to satisfy third element of three-pronged reasonable seizure test).
111. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (central concern of fourth amendment is
to assure protection of individual from random, arbitrary police activity); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (fourth amendment protects individuals from "standardless and
unconstrained discretion" of police); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)
(fourth amendment prevents "arbitrary and oppressive interference" in individual rights by
police); United States v, Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (central concern of fourth amendment
is to protect personal privacy from random harassment by police); State v. Jones, 483 So.2d
433, 438 (Fla. 1986) (requiring adherence to neutral criteria in operation of drunk driving
roadblock to prevent exercise of unbridled discretion by police); People v. Bartley, 109 lll.2d
273, -, 486 N.E.2d 880, 887 (1985) (key factor to eliminate in sobriety checkpoint is exercise
of police discretion), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1384 (1986); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass.
81, -, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1111 (1985) (Abrams, J., concurring) (principal goal of constitutional
roadblock is preventing exercise of unbridled discretion).
112. See Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, -. , 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 669 (1985)
(detention should last only long enough to check for signs of intoxication); State v. Jones, 483
So.2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1986) (police should minimize length of detention at sobriety checkpoint);
see also supra text accompanying note 23 (definition of objective intrusion).
113. See Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 274. In Lowe, the police asked the defendant only to display
his driver's license before subjecting the defendant to further tests for intoxication. Id.; see
infra text accompanying notes 141-49 (discussion of detention subsequent to initial stop). The
Lowe court described the initial stop as "momentary," but did not reveal the range or nature
of questions that the police asked motorists. 337 S.E.2d at 277. The Virginia Supreme Court
did mention that the manual by which the police operated the sobriety checkpoint contained
procedures detailing the manner in which police would question motorists. Id. The court did
not disclose specific provisions of the manual. Id.
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ask motorists to exit vehicles unless the police suspected the driver of drunk
driving. "4
While restricting the discretion of individual police officers may eliminate
the objective intrusion, such a restriction may not reduce substantially the
subjective intrusion upon personal privacy rights." 5 The very purpose of
sobriety checkpoints causes subjective intrusion. ' 6 Since police usually will
not divulge the precise location of a drunk driving roadblock, the element
of surprise causes a heightened degree of intrusion.'"7 Because subjective
intrusion involves the perception of individual drivers, police must implement
means designed to minimize the infringement upon constitutional rights
perceived by individual motorists." 8 The appearance of limited police discre-
tion, therefore, is essential to minimize the degree of subjective intrusion." 9
For example, if drivers approaching a sobriety checkpoint notice that police
114. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d at 886; see State v. Superior Court for County of Pima, 143
Ariz. 45,-, 691 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1984) (en banc) (objective intrusion minimized at sobriety
checkpoint because police detained drivers for five to 20 seconds and asked only one or two
questions); State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 31, 318 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1984) (initial detention
at sobriety checkpoint minimal because police delayed motorists only for one or two minutes);
People v. Garcia, -Ind. App.-, 481 N.E.2d 148, 154 (1985) (police minimized objective
intrusion at sobriety checkpoint by detaining drivers for two or three minutes); State v.
McLaughlin, -Ind.-, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1138 (1984) (objective intrusion minimal since
average length of detention at drunk driving roadblock was two to three minutes, and police
asked motorists only for licenses and registration forms).
115. Drunk Drivers in Indiana, supra note I, at 1482; see supra text accompanying note
24 (definition of subjective intrusion).
116. Grossman, supra note 3, at 153.
117. Id. at 150.
118. See Roadblock Seizures, supra note 1, at 1482 (police can reduce subjective intrusion
only if motorists perceive detention as routine, official, and systematic); see also State v. Jones,
483 So.2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1986) (approving use of sobriety checkpoint). In State v. Jones, the
police arrested the defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol at a drunk driving
roadblock. Jones, 483 So.2d at 434. Although the lower court noted that a properly conducted
sobriety checkpoint would be constitutional, the lower court held that the roadblock at issue
violated the fourth amendment because the police failed to operate the roadblock according to
neutral procedures predetermined by supervisory personnel. Jones v. State, 459 So.2d 1068,
1076, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1986). In
analyzing the constitutionality of the drunk driving roadblock, the Florida Supreme Court stated
that a roadblock detention constituted a seizure under the fourth amendment and employed a
balancing test, weighing the state's interest against the individual's interest. Jones, 483 So.2d at
435. In Jones, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized the importance of police adhering to
neutral criteria when conducting a sobriety checkpiont. Id. at 438. The Jones court stated that
police must operate a sobriety checkpoint pursuant to written guidelines and must display
indicia of official authority. Id. at 438-39. In addition, the court stated that the fourth
amendment requires police to provide adequate lighting and to place signs ahead of the roadblock
to inform approaching motorists of the purpose of the detention. Id. at 439. The Jones court,
however, stated that the fourth amendment did not require police to give advance notice to the
media of the operation a checkpoint. Id. The Florida Supreme Court mentioned that a
determination of the effectiveness of a sobriety checkpoint in detecting drunk drivers would aid
the constitutional analysis of the roadblock, but the court stated that a roadblock conducted
pursuant to uniform, neutral guidelines would be constitutional. Id.
119. Roadblock Seizures, supra note 1, at 1474.
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stop vehicles according to a systematic procedure and the drivers see signs
of official police authority, the roadblock is less likely to frighten the
motorists. 20 The roadblock, therefore, should not give the driver the feeling
police are singling out motorists for detention.' 2'
Courts analyze the subjective intrusion present at a sobriety checkpoint
in relation to the physical characteristics of the roadblock and the amount
of discretion, either actual or perceived, that the police officers exercise when
conducting the roadblock. 122 In finding that the physical characteristics of
the roadblock in Lowe minimized the subjective intrusion upon the motorists,
the Virginia Supreme Court noted that the roadblock area was well-lighted,
that a lighted sign informed approaching motorists of the sobriety check-
point, and that police provided an adequate area for subsequent detentions.
23
More importantly, the Lowe court noted that the existence of predetermined,
objective procedures designed by supervisory police officers eliminated actual
discretion on the part of the field officers. 24 Furthermore, in Lowe, the
120. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
894-95 (1975). But see Rogers, The Drunk Driving Roadblock: Random Seizure or Minimal
Intrusion, 21 CuM. L. BULL. 197, 199 (1985) (Supreme Court's analysis in Prouse is faulty in
asserting that signs of police authority somehow will reduce subjective intrusion); Jacobs &
Strossen, supra note 3, at 630 n.154 (likely that many feel threatened by spectacle of flashing
lights, flares, police officers, and police cars).
121. Roadblock Seizures, supra note 1, at 1474-75; Note, Criminal Law-Random Spot
Check for Driver's License and Motor Vehicle Registration Held Unconstitutional-Delaware
v. Prouse, 28 KAN L. REv. 345, 352 (1980).
122. See State v. McLaughlin, -Ind. App._ , 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1139 (1984) (subdi-
viding factors of subjective intrusion into physical characteristics of roadblock, discretion
motorists perceive, and discretion police actually exercise).
123. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 274; see State v. Superior Court for County of Pima, 143 Ariz.
45,-_, 691 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1984) (en banc) (subjective intrusion reduced by signs indicating
purpose of checkpoint); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, -, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 669
(1985) (validating drunk driving roadblock when warning signs informed approaching motorists
of existence of roadblock); State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1986) (police should provide
adequate lighting and place warning signs in advance of roadblock to reduce intrusion upon
motorists); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,-_, 677 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983) (police should give
advance warning of roadblock to approaching motorists); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 490,
479 A.2d 903, 905 (1984) (police placed 20 square-foot sign ahead of valid roadblock to inform
approaching motorists of purpose of sobriety checkpoint); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599,
604 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding roadblock unconstitutional when police gave no advance notice
and placed no warning signs); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 527-28, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653,
473 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1984) (subjective intrusion reduced by visible signs announcing purpose of
sobriety checkpoint).
124. See Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 276-77 (police officers received special training and operated
roadblock pursuant to instructions in police manual). Topics covered in the procedural manual
that the police used in Lowe included specifications concerning how police would man and
equip the roadblock, procedures for stopping traffic and questioning motorists, and methods
by which to determine if a motorist was intoxicated. Id. at 277; see Bartley, 486 N.E.2d at 887.
In Bartley, the Illinois Supreme Court found a minimal amount of subjective intrusion because
police in Bartley exercised no unbridled or arbitrary discretion in operating the sobriety
checkpoint. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d at 887. In holding the roadblock constitutional, the Bartley
court noted that supervisory personnel selected the location of the roadblock and that a manual
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police chose the roadblock location based on data revealing the locations of
previous drunk driving arrests and alcohol-related accidents, thus providing
a rational basis for the selection of the site and eliminating the possibility of
police randomly choosing the location for a roadblock.'25 Finally, in reducing
explained police procedure. Id. In Commonwealth v. Trumble, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that the sobriety checkpoint in question met the standards established by
the court for evaluating the constitutionality of sobriety roadblocks in Commonwealth v.
McGeoghegan. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81,-, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (1985); see McGeoghegan,
389 Mass. 137,-., 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983) (roadblock deemed unreasonable and uncon-
stitutional). In invalidating a sobriety checkpoint in McGeoghegan, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court noted that field officers used discretion in deciding which vehicles to stop at the
roadblock, that police provided inadequate lighting and warnings to motorists concerning the
purpose of the roadblock, and that the police established an insufficient show of official status.
McGeoghegan, 449 N.E.2d at 353. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, stated
that the guidelines by which the police conducted the sobriety checkpoint in Trumble provided
for no arbitrary discretion on the part of the police. Trumble, 483 N.E.2d at 1107. Supervisory
police personnel planned the roadblock in advance, determining such factors as date, location,
time, and duration of the detention at the roadblock. Id. The Trumble court, therefore, found
the sobriety checkpoint to be constitutional. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Amaral, 398 Mass. 98,
101, 495 N.E.2d 276, 279 (1986) (invalidating sobriety checkpoint under fourth amendment and
state constitution). In Commonwealth v. Amaral, the police arrested the defendant at a drunk
driving roadblock for driving under the influence of alcohol. Amaral, 495 N.E.2d at 277. The
trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating evidence that the police
obtained at the roadblock. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, reversed
the lower court because the state failed to prove the reasonableness of the roadblock. Id. at 278.
The Amaral court noted that the police conducted the sobriety checkpoint in a well-lighted loca-
tion and that the police placed signs that information motorists of the roadblock. Id. The police
also parked marked vehicles with lights flashing at the scene of the roadblock and stopped all vehicles
entering the roadblock. Id. The court, nevertheless, invalidated the roadblock at issue in Amaral
because the state failed to demonstrate that the police operated the sobriety checkpoint pursuant
to predetermined guidelines promulgated by administrative or supervisory personnel. Id. at 279.
The Amaral court stated that the government failed to prove adherence f ' specific guidelines
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court approved in Trumble that mitigate the exercise
of discretion by police officers. Id.; see State v. Superior Court for County of Pima, 143 Ariz.
45,-, 691 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1984) (en banc) (validating roadblock conducted pursuant to
procedural manual written by detached police official); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App.3d
1028, -, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 667 (1985) (promulgation of sobriety checkpoint guidelines by
supervisory personnel reduces possibility of arbitrary police harassment); State v. Jones, 483
So.2d 433, 438 (Fla. 1986) (police must conduct sobriety checkpoint according to written
guidelines outlining reasonably specific procedures); State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 29-30,
318 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1984) (sobriety checkpoints must operate according to specific pre-arranged
procedures promulgated by supervisory personnel); State v. Garcia, -Ind. App.__ 481
N.E.2d 148, 154 (1985) (approving roadblock conducted pursuant to predetermined plan
designed by supervisory personnel); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,-, 677 P.2d 1174, 1185
(1983) (supervisory police officer must set checkpoint guidelines); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485,
506, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (1984) (drunk driving roadblocks must operate according to regulations
approved by supervisory administrators); State v. Muzik, 379 N.E.2d 599, 604 (Minn. App.
1985) (invalidating drunk driving roadblock not operated according to specific administrative
procedures).
125. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 276; see State v. Superior Court for County of Pima, 143 Ariz.
45,-, 691 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1984) (en banc) (checkpoint site chosen where high percentage
of accidents related to alcohol occurred); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 489, 479 A.2d 903, 905
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the danger that motorists might perceive police officers exercising discretion
at the sobriety checkpoint, the Lowe court noted that the police systematically
stopped all vehicles or vehicles at regular intervals and made a sufficient
showing of official status with uniformed officers and flashing police car
lights. 126 Since the police employed neutral criteria that minimized the intru-
sion on motorists, the Lowe court correctly held that the compelling state
interest in combatting drunk driving outweighed the intrusion on individual
constitutional rights.
127
(1984) (holding checkpoint valid when police selected site for roadblock on basis of previous
alcohol-related accidents); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Minn. App. 1985) (invalidating
sobriety checkpoint because of insufficient evidence showing roadblock site selected rationally);
State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 582, 427 A.2d 131, 134 (1980) (valid roadblock set up
where some fatal alcohol-related accidents previously had occurred).
126. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277; see Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App.3d 1028,-, 221
Cal. Rptr. 659, 669 (1985) (validating drunk driving roadblock when flashing lights, flares,
police vehicles, and uniformed officers reassured motorists that roadblock was official); State
v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1986) (police must display visible signs of authority such as
wearing uniforms to reduce fears of motorists); People v. Conway, 135 I1. App.3d 887, ,
482 N.E.2d 437, 438 (1985) (approving roadblock when all vehicles stopped and police cars
parked with lights flashing); State v. McLaughlin, -Ind. App.._ , 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1139
(1984) (subjective intrusion reduced when motorists could see that police stopped all vehicles at
roadblock, placed flares in road, and flashed lights on police cars); State v. Garcia, -_Ind. App.
__, 481 N.E.2d 148, 154 (1985) (approving roadblock when vehicles stopped in groups of five and
roadblock manned by uniformed officers); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 491, 479 A.2d 903, 913
(1984) (approving police practice of stopping all vehicles at checkpoint); State v. Coccomo, 177
N.J. Super. 575, 583, 428 A.2d 131, 135 (1980) (uniformed officers and marked cars present at
valid sobriety checkpoint); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 524, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651, 473
N.E.2d 1, 5 (1984) (subjective intrusion reduced by visible fact that police stopped cars
systematically and by presence of marked police cars); State v. Alexander, 22 Ohio Misc.2d 34,
-, 489 N.W.2d 1093, 1096 (1985) (subjective intrusion reduced when police stopped all vehicles
at sobriety checkpoint).
127. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277. See generally State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, -. , 496 A.2d 442
(1985). The Vermont Supreme Court recently evaluated a roadblock designed to detect drunk
driving in State v. Martin. 496 A.2d at 445. In Martin, the Vermont State Police set up a
roadblock without prior notice. Id. at 449. The police parked two marked police cars with
lights flashing alongside the road and directed traffic into an adjacent parking lot. Id. The
police informed the motorists of the purpose of the roadblock, inspected the motorists' licenses
and registration forms, and checked for signs of intoxication. Id. In remanding the case for
rehearing, the Martin court suggested several criteria for the trial court to consider when
addressing the constitutionality of the drunk driving roadblock. Id. The Martin court stated
that police should explain the nature of the roadblock to motorists, police should operate the
roadblock according to objective guidelines to eliminate the exercise of subjective discretion by
field officers, police should place signs on the road to warn motorists of the roadblock ahead,
police should stop systematically, not randomly, all vehicles at the roadblock, and that police should
display legitimate authority to reduce subjective intrusion. Id. at 448. The Martin court explained
that the criteria were not absolute requirements, but suggested that the Vermont state courts
apply the standards on a case by case basis to determine the constitutional validity of sobriety
checkpoints. Id.; see also State v. Hillesheim, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980) (setting forth
criteria for lower courts to use when evaluating roadblock seizures). In State v. Hillesheim, the
police set up a roadblock in response to a recent outbreak of vandalism in the area. 291 N.W.2d
at 315. The Iowa Supreme Court invalidated the roadblock under the fourth amendment. Id.
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While the Virginia Supreme Court correctly approved the sobriety check-
point in Lowe v. Commonwealth, the court should have addressed more
carefully the procedures by which the police conducted the roadblock and
especially the appropriate procedures for subsequent detentions.'2 8 The Lowe
court did not prescribe any roadblock criteria, but merely ratified the
procedures that the police used.' 2 9 Police and motorists in Virginia would
benefit from a more scrutinizing analysis from the court.
As a further measure to restrict the exercise of discretion at a roadblock,
police should acquire a judicial warrant before conducting a sobriety check-
point.'30 To obtain a judicial warrant, police should demonstrate the seriousness
at 319. The Hillesheim court noted that when police have no probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to stop a vehicle, police, nevertheless, may detain a vehicle and its occupants when
police follow certain criteria. Id. at 318. The court's criteria included selecting a safe roadblock
site, placing advance warning signs ahead of the roadblock that inform approaching motorists
of the purpose of the detention, making a sufficient display of authority with uniformed officers
and marked police vehicles, and conducting the roadblock pursuant to neutral, predetermined
guidelines promulgated by administrative officials. Id.; see State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, -,
383 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1986) (per curiam) (invalidating sobriety checkpoint at which police
employed no neutral guidelines to prevent exercise of discretion). In State v. Crom, the police
arrested the defendant at a sobriety checkpoint for operating an automobile under the influence
of alcohol. Crom, 383 N.W.2d at 462. At the roadblock, the police stopped every fourth vehicle
on the pretext of checking driver's licenses and vehicle registration forms, but the actual purpose
of the roadblock was to detect and apprehend drunk drivers. Id. at 461; see infra note 132 and
accompanying text (courts invalidate sobriety checkpoints set up in guise of license check). The
police conducted the roadblock pursuant to no predetermined standards established by super-
visory personnel, but rather operated the roadblock at their discretion. Crom, 383 N.W.2d at
463. The Nebraska Supreme Court found the drunk driving roadblock at issue in Crom
unconstitutional under the fourth amendment because the police unreasonably and arbitrarily
invaded the defendant's right to privacy. Id. The Crom court, therefore, affirmed the lower
court's reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id.; see supra note 111 and accompanying text
(principal concern of fourth amendment is prevention of arbitrary police harassment).
128. See infra text accompanying notes 141-47 (discussion of detention subsequent to initial
stop at drunk driving roadblock).
129. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277.
130. See Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 674 (police should obtain authorization of
sobriety checkpoint by securing judicial warrant for operation of roadblock); Roadblock
Seizures, supra note I, at 1484 (police should obtain judicial warrant justifying roadblock);
Drunk Drivers in Indiana, supra note 1, at 1093 (judicial warrant for sobriety checkpoint would
minimize police discretion). Some courts require a judicial warrant for the operation of a
sobriety checkpoint. See State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 395 (S.D. 1976) (police must acquire
judicial warrant before conducting drunk driving roadblock); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676,
683 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (implying that police should obtain judicial warrant before conducting
sobriety checkpoint). But see Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 508-09, 479 A.2d 903, 915 (1984)
(judicial warrant not required for operation of sobriety roadblock).
The United States Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte held that the visibility of official police
authority supplanted the need for a judicial warrant when operating a permanent roadblock.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565. Given the possibility of the exercise of discretion by police
in operating temporary roadblocks such as sobriety checkpoints, however, a judicial warrant would
reduce the possibility of police randomly setting up roadblock sites. A greater chance for the
exercise of police discretion exists with a temporary roadblock than with one that is permanent.
The permanance of a roadblock, however, is not a significant factor affecting the constitutionality
of the checkpoint if police properly conduct the roadblock operation. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175
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of the drunk driving problem in the vicinity of the proposed roadblock and
submit neutral, objective procedures by which police plan to conduct the road-
block.' 3' Before issuing a warrant, courts must require police to state the
purpose of the sobriety checkpoint, which would prevent the police from
using the roadblock as a subterfuge for detecting other crimes. 3 2 Police
should document the number of vehicles stopped, the number of arrests
made, and the length of the average detention at drunk driving roadblocks
to generate a pool of data to evaluate empirically the effectiveness of the
sobriety checkpoint and to demonstrate adherence to predetermined guide-
lines. 33 Furthermore, an utmost concern of police should be safety for the
officers and motorists at the sobriety checkpoint.'
34
The State Attorney General's office or state legislature could aid police
by writing the standards by which police should operate a sobriety check-
point. 35 These standards, of course, should establish objective criteria to
Cal. App. 3d 1028, -, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 668 (1985); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 508, 479 A.2d
903, 914 (1984); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 527-28, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653, 473 N.E.2d
1, 5 (1984). The critical factor in the operation of a sobriety checkpoint is the absence of police
discretion. LAFAvE, supra note 70, at 210. A judicial warrant would supplement the roadblock
procedures that courts prescribe as protections against random and arbitrary police action. See
supra text accompanying notes 111-27 (discussing guidelines that reduce police discretion at
drunk driving roadblocks).
131. Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 674; Roadblock Seizures, supra note 1, at 1479,
1485.
132. See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 136 Ariz. 1,._ , 663 P.2d 992,
996 (1983) (en banc) (invalidating use of license check roadblock to detect drunk drivers); State
v. Baldwin, 124 N.H. 770,_..., 475 A.2d 522, 526-27 (1984) (police cannot extend roadblock
beyond predetermined purpose); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(invalidating sobriety checkpoint set up in guise of license check).
133. Roadblock Seizures, supra note 1, at 1483.
134. See Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277 (police provided adequate space and lighting for detention,
and officers wore reflecting vests). As an additional safety precaution, the police in Lowe
established the roadblock on a street where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. Brief for
Appellee at 5, Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985); see also Jones v.
State, 459 So.2d 1068, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (roadblock marked with barricades and
cones, but police should have used flares, flashing lights, or signs), aff'd, State v. Jones, 483
So.2d 433 (Fla. 1986); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,-, 677 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983) (police
should employ safety measures at sobriety checkpoints); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 490, 479
A.2d 903, 905 (1984) (safety was primary concern since police set up valid roadblock to provide
adequate space for detentions and to prevent traffic congestion); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d
676, 683 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (invalidating roadblock when police did not maintain safety
conditions).
135. See Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, -, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 670 (1985)
(validating sobriety checkpoint conducted pursuant to guidelines that California Attorney
General established); see also id. at 671-72 (White, J., dissenting) (legislature should endorse
use of sobriety roadblock); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,-_, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185-86 (1983)
(suggesting that legislature or state attorney general establish procedures for drunk driving
roadblock); Little v.State, 300 Md. 485, 490, 479 A.2d 903, 905 (1984) (guidelines for valid
sobriety checkpoint reviewed and approved by governor and attorney general); Jacobs &




limit the discretion of field officers.'3 6 Some states have enacted statutes that
authorize the use of roadblocks to check licenses and registration forms.'
a"
While police conceivably could observe motorists for signs of intoxication at
a statutorily authorized license checkpoint and arrest drivers for driving
under the influence of alcohol after noticing outward manifestations of
intoxication,'3 8 many courts have invalidated such a practice.3 9 Since states
have authorized license checkpoints by statute, state legislatures similarly
should help ensure the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints by enacting
statutes that give police the power to operate drunk driving roadblocks."40
In addition to analyzing the constitutionality of the initial detention at
a sobriety checkpoint, the reasonableness of a subsequent detention for the
purpose of testing motorists suspected of drunk driving is an essential element
in the validity of the sobriety checkpoint as a whole. An extended detention
at a drunk driving roadblock is more intrusive than the initial stop because
police usually subject motorists to a variety of field tests.' 4 ' Because the
detention of a driver suspected of intoxication involves an exercise of
discretion by police, courts should require that police have a reasonable,
articulable basis for subjecting the suspected driver to sobriety tests to limit
the exercise of police discretion. 4 2 For example, the United States Supreme
136. See supra text accompanying notes 111-27 (discussing criteria mitigating exercise of
discretion by police at drunk driving roadblocks).
137. See State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 584, 427 A.2d 131, 132 (1980) (statute
authorized police to check licenses, registration forms, and insurance cards at roadblock); Brief
for Appellee at 10, Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985) (statute
authorized roadblock designed to check licenses).
138. See United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854, 855 (10th Cir. 1981) (upholding conviction
for possession of cocaine seized at license checkpoint). In Prichard, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that police had the power to investigate any crimes for
which the police had reasonable suspicion at a valid license checkpoint. Id. at 857.
139. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (state courts invalidate sobriety checkpoint
set up in guise of license checkpoint). In Lowe v. Commonwealth, the police conducted a
roadblock to check licenses and to check for intoxication. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 274. The
Virginia Supreme Court held that the roadblock was constitutional even though the roadblock
consisted of a sobriety checkpoint coupled with a statutorily authorized license check. Id.; Brief
for Appellee at 10, Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985).
140. See State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (drunk driving
roadblock would be constitutional if statutorily authorized); Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3,
at 669 (legislatures should authorize sobriety checkpoints by statute).
141. Roadblock Seizures, supra note 1, at 1481; see People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 316
(Colo. 1984) (en banc) (field sobriety tests involve examination of person's coordination to
determine if person is intoxicated). The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Carlson listed
four tests that police employ to determine if a person is intoxicated. Carlson, 677 P.2d at 316
n.6. The tests included reciting the alphabet, walking a straight line, standing erect with head
tilted back, and placing the finger to the nose and ear lobe. Id.; see Jacobs & Strossen, supra
note 3, at 610 (listing field sobriety tests).
142. Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 656, 668; Rogers, supra note 120, at 205, 207;
see Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App.3d 1028,-., 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 669 (1985) (general
principles of arrest and detention govern further detention of person after initial stop); State v.
Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 31, 319 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1984) (subsequent detention of motorist at
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Court in United States v. Ortiz' 3 held that while police need not exercise
reasonable suspicion to stop vehicles at a properly conducted roadblock,
police must obtain consent or have probable cause to search a vehicle after
the initial stop at the roadblock.1' The Ortiz Court claimed that while the
initial detention at a roadblock involves less intrusion upon motorists than
stops by roving patrols, a search subsequent to the initial stop at a checkpoint
constitutes a substantial invasion of privacy. 1S The Court reasoned that because
predetermined guidelines for a checkpoint may not limit the discretion of
officers in selecting vehicles for subsequent detentions,146 police must justify
a subsequent detention according to some objective criterion such as prob-
able cause.'" Because the administration of field sobriety tests constitutes a
roadblock was lawful because police had reasonable and articulable belief that defendant was
drunk); LAFAVE, supra note 70, at 215 (police should have reasonable suspicion of intoxication
before subjecting motorist to field sobriety tests after initial stop at sobriety roadblock); see
also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of reasonable, articulable
suspicion).
143. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
144. See id. at 896-97. In United States v. Ortiz, the police stopped the defendant's car at
an immigration roadblock and found three illegal aliens upon searching the vehicle. Id. at 891-
92. The police arrested the defendant/driver, and the trial court convicted the defendant of
illegally transporting aliens. Id. at 892. In Ortiz, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court's reversal of the conviction stemming from an arrest that followed an automobile
search without probable cause. Id.
145. Id. at 895.
146. Id. at 895-96; see supra note Ill and accompanying text (fourth amendment restricts
exercise of discretion by police).
147. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 896-97. A question remains as to whether a motorist may avoid a
sobriety checkpoint by turning around before entering the roadblock and whether the driver
must answer the policeman's questions and comply with a request to display a license or
registration. Grossman, supra note 3, at 140. In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States
Supreme Court stated that in a Terry stop situation, the suspect lawfully may refuse to respond
to questions that police ask. Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); see supra note 20 and
accompanying text (discussing Terry seizure). Furthermore, the Court in Berkemer reasoned
that unless the suspect's answers, or the lack thereof, to the questions give police probable
cause to arrest, the police must release the suspect. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40; see Stark v.
Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057, 1062 (D. Minn. 1984) (failure of motorist to stop or enter sobriety
checkpoint is not grounds for arrest). The states are divided on the issue of whether motorists
may evade a sobriety checkpoint. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court for County of Pima, 143
Ariz. 45,-., 691 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1984) (en banc) (if driver did not speak to police at
sobriety checkpoint or if motorist turned to avoid roadblock, police followed driver and would
stop driver only if officer observed some infraction); State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 28,
318 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1984) (police stopped drivers who tried to avoid drunk driving roadblock);
Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 490, 479 A.2d 903, 905-06, 914 (1984) (police provided room for
drivers to turn around and avoid sobriety roadblock, motorists not required to roll down
windows and talk to police, and police did not follow cars that turned around unless drivers
drove erratically); People v. Peil, 122 Misc.2d 617, 621, 471 N.Y.S. 532, 535 (1984) (if drivers
did not roll down windows of car or speak to police, police would have allowed motorists to
proceed); Brief for Appellant at 7, Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985)
(if motorist had turned around to avoid roadblock, police would have stopped motorist). Police
should require that motorists pass through a sobriety checkpoint because allowing drivers to
avoid the roadblock would undermine the roadblock's deterrent effect on drunk driving since
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minimal intrusion, police need only reasonable suspicion of intoxication to
direct a motorist to a detention area to perform such tests.'1 Administering
a blood alcohol test, however, is a full search and requires police to have
probable cause to believe the suspect is intoxicated.
49
The constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint hinges on the balance
between the state's interest in providing for safe highways and the roadblock's
intrusion upon personal privacy. '50 Because the drunk driving roadblock is not
as effective in detecting and apprehending drunk drivers as is a routine
roving patrol that stops drivers based on erratic driving behavior, the state
must rely on the fact that the deterrence effect of the roadblock outweighs
motorists would know that they could escape detection of intoxication. Little v. State, 300 Md.
485, 518, 479 A.2d 903, 920 (1984) (Davidson, J., dissenting); see supra notes 74 and 108
(sobriety checkpoints deter drunk driving).
148. LAFAvE, supra note 70, at 215; see supra note 142 and accompanying text (courts
require police to have reasonable suspicion that driver is intoxicated before subjecting driver to
further investigation of intoxication); see also Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 274. While the Virginia
Supreme Court in Lowe did not discuss the validity of the subsequent detention, the police in
Lowe had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain the defendant and to investigate for
intoxication. For example, the police in Lowe smelled alcohol and noticed that the defendant's
eyes were red. Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 274. In observing drivers for intoxication, police look for
outward manifestations of intoxication such as bloodshot or watery eyes, slurred speech, the
odor of alcohol on the breath of the driver, and fumbling to retrieve a license or registration
form from a glove compartment, purse, or wallet. State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 28, 318
S.E.2d 693, 696 (1984); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 539,-., 673 P.2d 1174, 1177, 1186 (1983);
Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 492, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super.
575, 580, 427 A.2d 131, 133 n.5; State v. Alexander, 22 Ohio Misc.2d 34,-., 489 N.W.2d
1093, 1095 (1985); Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 3, at 609; see supra note 141 and accompanying
text (police use coordination tests to determine if driver is intoxicated after observing outward
manifestations of intoxication).
149. See State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 31 318 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1984) (subsequent
detention at sobriety checkpoint is justified by reasonable suspicion of intoxication); State v.
Alexander, 22 Ohio Misc.2d 34,-., 489 N.W.2d 1093, 1097 (1985) (police did not subject
drivers to field sobriety tests unless police had reasonable suspicion that driver was intoxicated);
State v. Niles, 74 Or. App. 383,-_, 703 P.2d 1030, 1032 (1985) (police only need reasonable
suspicion that driver is intoxicated to subject driver to field sobriety tests); LAFAvE, supra note
70, at 215 (police need only reasonable suspicion of intoxication to subject driver to field
sobriety tests). But see People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 317 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (roadside
sobriety testing constitutes full search). In People v. Carlson, the Colorado Supreme Court
equated roadside sobriety testing with chemical testing to determine if a driver is intoxicated.
Id. The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that the ordinary citizen would desire to keep the
administration of the tests private and that the purpose of the tests was to gather incriminating
evidence. Id. The Carlson court, therefore, required police to have probable cause to arrest a
motorist for driving while intoxicated before subjecting the driver to field sobriety tests. Id.;
see also Jones v. State, 459 So.2d 1068, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct,. App. 1984) (police may conduct
field sobriety tests only when police have probable cause to believe the driver is intoxicated),
aff'd, 483 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1986). The dissent in Carlson, however, sagaciously noted that if
police have probable cause to arrest the driver, the police may arrest the driver without
administering the field sobriety tests. Carlson, 677 P.2d at 319 (Rovira, J., dissenting). The
dissent, therefore, concluded that police need only reasonable suspicion that the driver is
intoxicated before subjecting the motorist to the tests. Id.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9 (discussing fourth amendment balancing test).
1986] 1495
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
the intrusion of the seizure.' 5' Accordingly, police should notify the media
of the intent to employ the roadblock to enhance the checkpoint's deterrent
effect, but need not disclose the actual location of the roadblock. 5 2 Since
the constitutionally impermissible factors of the sobriety checkpoint include
the excessive intrusion upon personal freedom and the possibility of police
exercising unbridled discretion, neutral and objective procedures for the
operation of the roadblock aimed at reducing discretion and intrusion are
necessary to ensure the constitutional validity of a sobriety checkpoint. 53
Police, therefore, should conduct a sobriety checkpoint pursuant to proce-
dures designed by supervisory police department administrators and sanc-
tioned by a judicial warrant o according to guidelines enacted by the state
legislature to eliminate the possibility of police officers exercising unfettered
discretion in the field.'"
At present, the public is concerned about the drunk driving problem, and
the courts recognize the seriousness of the public's concern.," In the future,
however, the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints might depend on the
public's perception of the drunk driving menace. For example, if the public's
concern about the drunk driving problem diminishes, the intrusion of a drunk
driving roadblock upon individual rights might vitiate the constitutionality of
the roadblock, even if police conduct the roadblock pursuant to the neutral
and objective criteria that minimize intrusion." 6 Ironically, sobriety check-
151. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08 (roadblocks deter drunk driving); see also
LAFAVE, supra note 70, at 208 (courts need not make strong showing of effectiveness in detecting
drunk drivers to validate sobriety checkpoint). One commentator has stated that since the
United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse suggested that nonarbitrary roadblocks
would be constitutional, the minimally intrusive sobriety checkpoint requires no evidence that
the roadblock is more effective in detecting and apprehending drunk drivers than traditional
means. LAFAVE, supra note 70, at 208; see Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (suggesting that use of
roadblocks to enforce license and registration requirements would be constitutional).
152. See Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277 (police alerted media of roadblock but did not disclose
location); see also State v. Superior Court for County of Pima, 146 Ariz. 45,__, 691 P.2d
1073, 1075 (1984) (en banc) (press releases announced existence of roadblocks). In Pima, the
Arizona Supreme Court stated that police need not reveal the exact location of the sobriety
checkpoint because disclosure might detract from the deterrent effect. Pima, 691 P.2d at 1077;
see State v. Garcia, -_Ind. App.-., 481 N.E.2d 148, 154 (1985) (approving roadblock
when police advertised sobriety checkpoint); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,-., 677 P.2d
1174, 1185 (1983) (approving roadblock when police issued advance notice to public of sobriety
checkpoint); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676, 683 (Tex. App. 1985) (invalidating roadblock for
which police gave no advance notice).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 111-27 (objective, neutral guidelines mitigate field
officer's discretion).
154. See LAFAVE, supra note 70, at 205 (sobriety checkpoint is constitutional if properly
conducted).
155. See supra note I and accompanying text (documentation of drunk driving problem);
supra note 70 and accompanying text (courts recognize seriousness of drunk driving problem);
see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (listing vast majority of states that endorse
sobriety checkpoints or would endorse legitimate sobriety checkpoints).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 111-27 (adherence to predetermined guidelines
minimizes intrusion of sobriety checkpoints); see also supra text accompanying notes 7-9
(discussing Supreme Court's balancing test to determine reasonableness of seizure).
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points might prove to be so effective in combatting drunk driving and in reduc-
ing the number of alcohol-related accidents and fatalities that the court might
invalidate the roadblocks because the courts no longer perceive a compelling
state interest in eliminating drunk driving. The state's interest is to protect
the public, however, and invalidating the sobriety checkpoint and negating
its deterrent effect might result in a reversion to the serious problem that the
roadblock had helped rectify. In the future, therefore, courts should consider
carefully all possible factors contributing to a decrease in drunk driving. If
the heightened public concern about drunk driving has dissipated, but the reduc-
tion in incidences of drunk driving is attributable to sobriety checkpoints, courts
should not invalidate sobriety checkpoints because the courts unwittingly may
proscribe the very element that has caused and is maintaining the reduction
in drunk driving accidents.
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